Federal policymakers have supported many extraneous missions for the Department of Defense aside from the basic and constitutional requirement to defend the nation. The result is that America's military budget has become very bloated. The United States would be better off taking a wait-and-see approach to distant threats, while letting friendly nations bear more of the costs of their own defense, as we discuss in a related essay.

There will always be disorder in various places around the globe, but that doesn't mean that all foreign problems are a threat to America. We should retain the ability to participate in multilateral efforts to mitigate humanitarian disasters, but we should not mistake such efforts as something relevant to our defense.

By avoiding the occupation of failing states and limiting our commitments to defend healthy ones, we could plan for fewer wars. By shedding extraneous missions, we can cut our force structure, which means reducing the number of U.S. military personnel and the related costs for weapons, vehicles, and operations. The resulting U.S. military force would be more elite, less strained, and less expensive.

This essay describes 19 proposals that would reduce U.S. military spending by $1.2 trillion over the next 10 years, or about 18 percent of projected military spending in the administration's budget.¹ By 2020, the savings would be about $150 billion annually. Although those are substantial reductions, the estimates are conservative. In several cases, we likely erred on the side of undercounting savings. Also, a strategy of restraint could allow greater savings. We have not, for example, included cuts to the National Guard, the reserves, or our air and sea lift capabilities.

Some readers may wonder why we have not gone further, given that even steeper cuts would still leave the United States with a large margin of superiority over all rivals. The cuts we suggest are an initial harvest of restraint, and don't preclude further reductions. It would be prudent to first adopt changes like those we suggest, and then see if the political leadership is capable of adhering to a restrained defense strategy.

The table summarizes our proposed spending cuts. The text and endnotes provide readers with the information needed to understand how we arrived at our estimates.² Although the proposals fit within an overall strategic rationale, most of them could also stand alone as individual savings proposals.

1. Cut the nuclear weapons arsenal.

The nuclear weapons arsenal should be cut to 500 deployed warheads. This would include a 50 percent cut in the number of delivery platforms, and would include elimination of the bomber leg of the nuclear triad and consolidation of nuclear laboratory and testing facilities.³ Our proposals would cut $66 billion from the Department of Defense (DoD) budget and $21 billion from the Department of Energy (DoE) budget over 10 years.⁴

This proposal would retain six ballistic nuclear missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs), which would allow for at least four ballistic missile submarines to be deployed at any one time, saving $3 billion over 10 years.⁵ These platforms, which were designed to carry as many as 192 warheads, will deter any leader foolish enough to contemplate a strike on the United States. To make doubly sure, we would retain 150 Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles in the continental United States. We would also forego the purchase of Trident II missiles for the SSBNs and upgrades to nuclear cruise missiles and shelve plans to deploy nuclear weapons on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Because a smaller arsenal requires less support, we would consolidate nuclear weapons production and testing facilities, which fall under DoE's purview.

2. Reduce the size of the Army.

A reduction in the number of active-duty Army personnel from the current legislated end strength of 547,400 to 360,000 would save $220 billion over 10 years. This figure draws on a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) calculation that estimated the costs of expanding the Army by 65,000 personnel.⁶ We assume that our savings would be about two and a half times the value of the CBO estimate.

3. Reduce the size of the Marine Corps.

Reducing the size of the Marine Corps from 202,000 to 145,000 would save about $67 billion over 10 years. We would phase in these personnel reductions over 10 years. The estimated savings were obtained by modifying the CBO projections for the Army.

4. Reduce Marine Corps expeditionary strike groups.

A reduction in the number of Marine Corps expeditionary strike groups from 10 to 6 would save $7 billion over 10 years. These reductions are consistent with cuts in Marine Corps' personnel cited above. This proposal would decommission four Amphibious Assault Ships, four Amphibious Transport Dock Ships, and at least two Dock Landing Ships, while eliminating associated air wings. These cuts are justified because the likelihood of the Marines attacking a well-defended coast from the sea without support from carrier air power is remote. And the speed to deployment gained by having Marines sea-based is rarely worth its cost. By reducing the number of expeditionary strike groups to 6, $2.4 billion would be saved in operation and maintenance (O&M) costs over 10 years. Associated naval personnel cuts would save $4.6 billion.

5. Build and operate fewer aircraft carriers and naval aircraft.

Reducing the number of operational aircraft carriers (CVNs) from 12 to 8 would save $40 billion over 10 years. Current Navy plans call for 12 carriers by 2020.⁷ This proposal would continue production of the new Ford Class CVN 78, which will be deployed in 2015.⁸ Canceling procurement of CVN 79 and all future Ford Class CVNs would save $16 billion over 10 years (approximately $7 billion for CVN 79 and $9 billion for CVN 80). Decommissioning the Nimitz, Eisenhower, and Vinson would save at least $5 billion over 10 years in reduced O&M costs, including associated air wings. These savings would be partly offset by the decommissioning costs of about $1 billion per vessel.⁹ Another $12 billion would be saved in foregone procurement of 60 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters.¹⁰ Associated reductions in personnel would save $10 billion.

6. Build and operate fewer tactical submarines.

Reducing the number of tactical submarines would save $32 billion over 10 years.  Current plans show the number of fast-attack submarines (SSNs) declining to 40 ships by 2028.¹¹ The Navy can reach 40 in 2020, eight years earlier, by slowing the rate of procurement from two to one new vessel per year. Thus, instead of spending $5.8 billion per year, we could spend $2.9 billion per year, saving $29 billion in procurement and $1 billion in O&M costs over 10 years. Decommissioning the four active guided missile submarines (SSGN) would save at least $500 million in O&M over 10 years, but we estimate that these savings would be offset in the short term by the costs to dispose of the vessels. Savings from reductions in personnel onboard tactical submarines would be $2 billion.

7. Build and operate fewer destroyers.

We would save $34 billion over 10 years by reducing the number of destroyers (DDGs) that the Navy buys and operates. This reduction is accomplished by maintaining the number of DDG-51s at the current level of 62. The Navy has already proposed stopping production of the DDG-1000 at 3, and instead plans to buy 8 Flight IIA version DDG-51s and as many as 8 Flight III version DDG-51s by 2020 at an average cost of about $2 billion.¹² We would allow production of the three DDG-1000s to proceed but build no additional DDG-51s, and, where possible, reallocate funds already authorized. Avoiding production of 16 DDG-51s would save at least $30 billion, plus $1 billion in associated O&M costs and $1 billion from reductions in personnel.¹³

8. Terminate the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).

The Navy should halt the LCS program and consider developing a less expensive class of frigates or corvettes.¹⁴ Current LCS costs are roughly three times initial estimates. The high costs undermine the idea—always questionable—that the LCS could take on particularly risky missions. Cost has also undercut the LCS's modularity, where commanders could select a mission module, a package of software and equipment that can be swapped in and out to tailor each LCS to a mission. There are three such modules: mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and surface warfare. Presumably because of cost constraints, the Navy is building only about as many modules as ships, limiting flexibility.

Besides the 4 LCSs already (or nearly) completed, the Navy plans to build about 24 in the next 10 years, at an average cost of $620 million each.¹⁵ Forgoing these vessels would thus save $14.9 billion over the next 10 years, plus $3.1 billion in associated O&M costs. While researching alternative platforms, the Navy can refurbish 14 Perry class frigates at a cost of roughly $100 million each.¹⁶ These ships, along with destroyers, could perform the LCS's missions. After subtracting the costs of refurbishing and retaining the frigates and the additional personnel costs they require, net savings would be $14 billion over 10 years.¹⁷

9. Build and operate fewer Air Force fighters.

The Air Force should eliminate six strike wing equivalents, netting $89 billion in savings over 10 years. The drawdown would be accomplished by accelerating the retirement of aging airframes, especially F-15s and F-16s, and purchasing 301 fewer F-35s than currently programmed.¹⁸ The estimated cost per new aircraft is $200 million, which translates into $60 billion in reduced procurement expenses, plus $29 billion in reduced personnel and O&M expenses.

10. Terminate the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.

The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle is 14 years behind schedule and 160 percent over budget.¹⁹ It serves an archaic mission—amphibious assault on a hostile shore. The last time such an amphibious assault occurred was the Inchon Landing in September 1950. In the highly unlikely event that the United States again employs Marines in this way, existing platforms, including the Assault Amphibious Vehicle 7A, will suffice. This proposal would save the approximately $11 billion needed to complete the program and purchase 573 vehicles.²⁰

11. Terminate the V-22 Osprey.

The Marine Corps should stop V-22 Osprey production and save the $23 billion estimated cost for the rest of the procurement.²¹ The V-22's cost is extraordinarily high relative to alternatives.²² It lacks reliability and lift. Its relatively small size means that other aircraft will have to bring supplies such as heavy weapons to the Marines it transports, but no supply aircraft can fly as far and as fast, meaning that either V-22s will drop Marines off in places where they cannot be equipped to fight, or more likely, it will not be used at full range, undermining a primary argument for its procurement.²³ Proven rotary-wing aircraft, such as the MH-60 and the CH-53, should handle this mission. After subtracting the cost of procuring and operating alternative platforms for troop and material transport, total savings for the elimination of the V-22 program equal $15 billion over 10 years.

12. Realign the missile defense program.
 
The administration's FY 2011 budget requested $9.9 billion for missile defense, which is similar to spending levels in recent years. Our proposal would save about $60 billion over 10 years by shifting missile defense funding from procurement to research and development and canceling components with excessive cost overruns.²⁴ Assuming that DoD currently plans to spend an average of $9 billion annually, reducing spending to about $3 billion annually would save at least $60 billion over 10 years.²⁵

13. Cut the Pentagon's civilian workforce.

A smaller military requires fewer civilian support personnel. And, as discussed below in the section on overhead, the Pentagon has excessive administrative apparatus even for its current broad missions. Accordingly, we would reduce the Pentagon civilian workforce by nearly a third, with most of the cuts coming through attrition.²⁶ The civilian workforce will total 789,000 in FY2011 and cost $77 billion. Reducing the civilian payroll by 30 percent over 10 years would save about $105 billion. This estimate mirrors reductions in personnel between 1991 and 2001, when civilian manpower was reduced by roughly 34 percent and total civilian compensation declined by just over 24 percent.²⁷

14. Reform military compensation.²⁸

Currently, some components of military compensation, including tax advantages and housing allowances, are not included in the pay raise calculations that are pegged to changes in the civilian sector.²⁹ We propose including these benefits when pay raises are calculated, phasing the reform in as forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan and Iraq. That would save $55 billion over 10 years.

Premiums for DoD's health care system, TRICARE, have not risen in 10 years.³⁰ Lower premiums encourage military retirees earning full-time civilian salaries to choose TRICARE even though health coverage is available through their employer. According to a June 2009 CBO report, reform of TRICARE could save more than $60 billion over 10 years.³¹ Such changes are more reasonable under a restraint strategy because that strategy would greatly reduce the burden on military personnel.

15. Reform maintenance and supply systems.

According to the CBO, reform of DoD maintenance and supply systems would save $13 billion over 10 years.³² Reforms would include consolidating DoD retailing, changing DoD's depot pricing structure for equipment repairs, and easing restrictions on contracting for depot maintenance.

16. Cut military construction and housing.

The cuts discussed here would allow reductions in the buildings needed to accommodate DoD personnel and thus in the military construction and family housing budget. The budget for these activities has been over $25 billion in recent years, although the administration sees spending falling to $14 billion by 2015. We propose cutting projected spending by 20 percent, or about $30 billion over 10 years.³³

17. Reform command, support, and infrastructure.

About 40 percent of DoD's budget goes toward overhead, including rents, depreciation of equipment, facilities maintenance, utilities, headquarters staff, information technology, and other defense-wide support programs.³⁴ The Defense Business Board, a DoD advisory group, recently noted that this overhead ratio is at an historic high, reflecting rapid growth in Pentagon management costs in recent decades.³⁵ As part of an effort to shift $100 billion from swollen overhead costs to force structure over the next decade, the secretary of Defense recently suggested closing Joint Forces Command and several other small DoD organizations, hiring fewer contractors, and reducing staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.³⁶

Those are welcome initiatives, but the savings should be used to reduce the deficit, rather than going into other programs. Furthermore, deeper cuts are warranted. The size of DoD under a strategy of restraint would need even less administrative support. We could, for example, eliminate or consolidate the geographic Combatant Commands. Because some of these savings are reflected in the cuts to civilian personnel and intelligence counted elsewhere, we follow DoD and estimate that cuts to overhead could save an average of $10 billion per year or about $100 billion over 10 years.

18. Reduce intelligence spending.

In 2009, then director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair stated that the U.S. intelligence budget was $75 billion. That included $45 billion for the National Intelligence Program and $30 billion for the Military Intelligence Program.³⁷ That amount is greatly expanded from the $27 billion spent on intelligence in 1998.³⁸ In turn, the 1998 intelligence budget exceeded the 1980 intelligence budget by almost 80 percent in real terms.³⁹ This rapid growth is excessive given the historically mild threats we face.

Redundancy in intelligence analysis can be useful by producing competing perspectives and thoroughness, but the explosion in intelligence spending has spawned organizational confusion and excessive overlap.⁴⁰ The Central Intelligence Agency, for example, is now carrying out paramilitary activities that should be the exclusive province of Special Operational Forces.⁴¹ Under our strategy of restraint, there would be even a larger excess in intelligence spending as a result of there being fewer enemies and military missions. Thus, we propose to cut 15 percent from the intelligence budget. Assuming that intelligence spending would otherwise remain at $75 billion annually, a 15 percent cut would save about $112 billion over 10 years. Roughly 20 percent of total intelligence spending falls outside of the "defense" function in the federal budget, about $22 billion of these savings would come from other sections of the budget.⁴²

19. Reduce research, development, testing, and evaluation.

In coming years, DoD plans to spend a about $73 billion annuallyon research, development, testing, and evaluation. Policymakers should reduce total RDT&E spending by 10 percent annually, which would generate about $73 billion in savings over 10 years. The reduced spending levels would still greatly exceed what would be required to maintain the U.S. military's quantitative and qualitative superiority over other nations for the foreseeable future.